Book Review: Restorative Justice, Self-Interest and Responsible Citizenship
Martin Wright reviews Lode Walgrave's book on the theoretical and ‘socio-ethical’ underpinnings of restorative justice.
By: Lode Walgrave. Cullompton, Devon,
and Portland, OR: Willan Publishing. 2008.
ISBN 978-1-84392-334-3 pbk £26.00; 978-1-84392-335-0
hbk £55.00
After editing and contributing to several books on restorative justice,
Lode Walgrave has brought together his thinking in one comprehensive
volume, which will prove a definitive step towards the progress of the
movement by improving its theoretical base, although he compares this
to the never-ending labour of Sisyphus. He sees restorative
justice as a distinct branch of ‘the other practices of resolving
conflicts and injustices that are inspired by the same participatory
and peace-promoting philosophy’ (p. 2), sometimes called restorative
approaches. Its essential feature is its focus on repairing harm
caused by a crime, i.e. a harm which also has a public dimension;
this leads him to accept that there may be a degree of coercion when a
voluntary process doesn’t work.
Walgrave rejects what he rather inelegantly calls ‘punitive apriorism’,
by which he seems to mean the presumption that the response to crime
should be punitive. In his definition, a response is not
punishment merely because it involves coercion, but only when it is
intended to hurt. He gives a good overview of some of the
objections to punishment: so far from giving a ‘message’ it
obstructs communication, encourages denial and defiance, is a top-down
tool of social control, and is ineffective.
As Foucault said, punishment can discipline the body but not the mind
(p. 136). It aims for a notional, unattainable proportionality of
harm inflicted to harm caused. Restorative justice, on the other
hand, is based on the ideal that ‘because crime hurts, justice should
heal’ (Braithwaite). The harm should be matched not by further
harm but by restorative effort. Denunciation is achieved through
the process itself. Walgrave also says that the other traditional
aim of sentencing, rehabilitation of the offender, neglects the
victims’ needs; but in fact what many victims want are measures
that make re-offending less likely.
Turning to socio-ethical grounds for restorative justice, Walgrave does
not agree with Pavlich’s rejection of general ethical principles as
‘expressions of totalitarianism’; the ideal of deliberative
justice accepts the idea of discourse in order to provide ‘hospitality’
(acceptance) of others – which is itself an ethical principle. He
combines Braithwaite and Pettit’s idea of ‘dominion’ (autonomy) with
the ethics of care, the responsibility of the well-off for those in
trouble, which combine to make communitarianism or ‘common
self-interest’. This is not natural, but learned; it comes
from replacing everlasting competition and conflict by ‘bundl[ing] my
self-interest with that of others’ (p. 80), and learning to contribute
collaboratively to family, class-room and so on.
The cardinal virtues are respect, solidarity and active
responsibility. Disrespect (such as racism or intolerant
religious fundamentalism) should be criminalized, though not of course
punitively. After interesting explorations of justice, freedom,
and wrongfulness (which ‘depends on the harm intended’ (p. 95)), he
concludes that the tensions inherent in common self-interest are about
‘how citizens participate decisively in the way society and community
are governed ... and interact in daily life’ (p. 99.).
The next chapter looks at the quality of restorative justice practice,
which obviously affects the process and outcome, though not as much as
earlier life experiences do. We should not expect it to ‘work’
but to ‘help’ by acting as a ‘gate-opener’ (which, he might have added,
is all sentencing can do); where it scores over punitive
sentencing is that it offers a positive motivation. But that is
only the beginning: a person needs support, prospects and decent
social conditions too. Walgrave sets out a research proposal, and
quotes figures from New Zealand showing the fall in arrests,
convictions and custodial sentences after the introduction of family
group conferences.
What would a restorative system look like? Walgrave proposes that
it should start from socio-ethical and legal principles, not political
ones, if it is to avoid co-optation by the state. He does not
follow Hulsman’s proposal to ‘civilize’ criminal justice, because that
ignores the impact of crime on the community. He accepts that
many conflicts can be dealt with by community mediation, but this does
not come within his definition of restorative justice. He does
however cite the Zwelethemba project in South Africa, which does so,
and calls for parsimony (minimum state intervention). There
should be at least consideration of a restorative process before any
judicial process, as in the juvenile systems in New Zealand and
latterly in Belgium, not least because victims are entitled to
it.
Walgrave optimistically suggests that the mediation service should be
funded but not steered by the judicial authorities. The sanctions
for enforcing agreements should themselves be restorative.
Safeguards are needed, for example the presumption of innocence and a
complaints procedure. He says he does not know of a case where an
innocent person was involved as an offender in a restorative process
(p. 159), but it can happen (Zernova 2007: 105-6).
Chapter 6 takes us to the last part of the title, arguing that
restorative justice could be not only a response to crime but a
movement towards a particpatory democracy in which the state makes more
parsimonious use of power. Walgrave looks at the condition of the
world, with globalization, penal populism and so on: as
governments cannot control the former, they fall back on the
latter. This feeds the public’s wish for security at the lowest
possible cost (and, he might have added, without making the effort to
work at community-building). There is a danger that restorative
justice could be co-opted into this process, and used merely as one
technique in an unreconstructed system; but criminologists can
resist it if they are willing to be ‘players’ and not just
‘floaters’.
Looking ahead, Walgrave sees restorative justice developing
deliberative conflict resolution practices, especially in schools – so
perhaps it is part of that wider movement after all? He ends by
setting four tasks: to improve the quality of restorative
justice, to explore its relation to law, develop its theory (and that
of other fields of conflict settlement), and devise a strategy to
overcome resistance. This seems to be in line with the
Zwelethemba ideal of being not just a response to crime but a form of
locally-based governance (Froestad and Shearing 2007).
Although some might wish for greater emphasis on the role of
non-government organizations, and on conferencing or circle sentencing
as ways of involving the community, this is an important book,
therefore, especially for academics who aspire to make a
difference, not only with regard to criminal justice but to the way
decisions are made that affect us all.
REFERENCE
Froestad, J and C Shearing (2007) ‘Beyond restorative justice –
Zwelethemba: a future-focused model using local capacity conflict
resolution. In: R Mackay et al., eds Images of resorative
justice theory, Frankfurt am Main: Verlag für
Polizeiwissenschaft.
Zernova, M (2007) Restorative justice: ideals and
realities. Aldershot: Ashgate.
Martin Wright
September 2008





