Co-option
The authority of the state is a powerful source of social control. Even
if restorative processes are used, the State's powers remain to give
effect to the agreement, to enforce it (Merry, 1989 at 249). This makes
restorative justice particularly susceptible to the distorting
influences and initiatives of a State apparatus geared towards
punishment. Some have argued that restorative processes and/or outcomes
may be used to satisfy retributive impulses (Watson, Boucherat and
Davis, 1989 at 212-228), even though victim and offender have
reconciled, reaching an agreement in mediation (Wright, 1996 at
236-37).
Goal displacement for utilitarian reasons is also a source of distortion, especially given the fiscal attractiveness of diversion of offenders to restorative processes (Minor and Morrison, 1996 at 124-125). Cost-effectiveness and maximizing social utility could become the primary concern instead of reparation or restoration.
An example of co-option is restitution being used for punitive purposes. Restitution could serve as an additional sanction to punitive sanctions already-imposed rather than an alternative sanction, thereby exacting more punishment on the offender (Walgrave, 1992 at 347-48).
Some have suggested that two things must be done to prevent the co-option of reparative sanctions: 1) coming to a reparative solution must be a voluntary process, and 2) the intent of the whole system should be reparative (Wright, 1996 at 236). Conditional deferment of prosecution of adjournment of a case could affirm the primary importance of reparation (Wright, 1992 at 533) by first allowing the parties voluntarily take part in a restorative process. If satisfactory reparation were made, the case need not return to the court. By strictly linking the social reaction to the offence, the sanction would be reparative in intent (Walgrave, 1992).
This document prepared by Christopher Bright. Copyright 1997 by Prison Fellowship International.
Goal displacement for utilitarian reasons is also a source of distortion, especially given the fiscal attractiveness of diversion of offenders to restorative processes (Minor and Morrison, 1996 at 124-125). Cost-effectiveness and maximizing social utility could become the primary concern instead of reparation or restoration.
An example of co-option is restitution being used for punitive purposes. Restitution could serve as an additional sanction to punitive sanctions already-imposed rather than an alternative sanction, thereby exacting more punishment on the offender (Walgrave, 1992 at 347-48).
Some have suggested that two things must be done to prevent the co-option of reparative sanctions: 1) coming to a reparative solution must be a voluntary process, and 2) the intent of the whole system should be reparative (Wright, 1996 at 236). Conditional deferment of prosecution of adjournment of a case could affirm the primary importance of reparation (Wright, 1992 at 533) by first allowing the parties voluntarily take part in a restorative process. If satisfactory reparation were made, the case need not return to the court. By strictly linking the social reaction to the offence, the sanction would be reparative in intent (Walgrave, 1992).
This document prepared by Christopher Bright. Copyright 1997 by Prison Fellowship International.
